Hastings Law Journal
Volume 38 | Issue 5

Article 5

1-1987

Crackdown: The Emerging Drug Exception to the
Bill of Rights
Steven Wisotsky

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging Drug Exception to the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 889 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol38/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug
Exception" to the Bill of Rights
by
STEVEN WISOTSKY*

[T]he history of the narcotics legislation in this country "reveals
the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery-detection, prosecution and punishment-tighter and
tighter."'
We don't
need [a search warrant]. We work in the drug
2
department.
Nineteen eighty-seven, the bicentennial of the Constitution, provides
an appropriate occasion to examine the condition and direction of constitutional rights in the United States. The framers of the Constitution,
animated by the spirit of William Pitt's dictum that "[u]nlimited power is
apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it,"3 carefully parcelled
out governmental power and controlled its exercise. After ratification in
1787, this central constitutional preoccupation with limiting governmental power manifested itself in the call for adoption of a Bill of Rights.
Disregarding the enigmatic, perhaps tautological ninth and tenth amendments, the core of the Bill of Rights is a code of criminal procedure
designed to ensure fair treatment and make it difficult for the government
to secure a criminal conviction. Beyond the realm of criminal prosecutions, the function of constitutional guarantees, especially the first and
fourth amendments, is to carve out "zones of privacy" for the exercise of
personal autonomy. These rights of self-expression 4 and "privacy and
repose' 5 are essential "to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center; B.A. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1970, University of Miami; LL.M. 1971, Yale University. This Essay expands
on ideas advanced in S. WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (1986).

1. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (quoting Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 390 (1957)).

2. Leen, 3 Fake Police Officers RansackHome, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at B4, col.
1; see infra text accompanying note 118.
3. Speech, Case of Wilkes (Jan. 9, 1770).
4. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970).

5.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see generally C. BLACK, STRUC(1969).
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happiness." '6
This Essay traces the current retreat from the historic constitutional
mission of shielding citizens from governmental overreaching. That retreat results principally from continuing escalations in the paramilitary
march of the War on Drugs on our legacy of limited government and
natural rights. 7 Since the early 1980s, the prevailing attitude has been
that cracking down on drugs is imperative. As a result, the three
branches of government have deferred very little to constitutional and
nonconstitutional limits on the exercise of governmental power in the
domain of drug enforcement. What Laurence Tribe describes as the
Constitution's "pivotal, even mythological place in our national consciousness '" s is rapidly being eroded by a positivist, bureaucratic attitude
that we can-must--do whatever is deemed necessary or expedient in
waging the War on Drugs. This situation would be bad enough if the
War on Drugs worked effectively to control the supply of illegal drugs.
It is tragic when the curtailment of "zones of privacy" is accompanied by
the tripling of cocaine imports to the United States, the emergence of
marijuana as a leading domestic agricultural product, and insistent demands for yet further escalations in the War.
The story begins on October 2, 1982, with a Presidential speech denouncing illegal drugs: "The mood towards drugs is changing in this
country and the momentum is with us. We're making no excuses for
drugs-hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad and we're going after
them."9 President Reagan continued this hard-line rhetoric in another
speech that month, pledging an "unshakable" commitment "to do what
is necessary to end the drug menace" and "to cripple the power of the
mob in America." 10
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
7. See infra note 116.
8. Tribe, The Constitution in the Year 2001, 18 PAC. L.J. 343, 344 (1987).
9. President's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249, 1249
(Oct. 2, 1982) [hereinafter Radio Address].
10. President's Message Announcing Federal Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and
Organized Crime, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1311, 1313-14 (Oct. 14, 1982). The President called for (and got) more of everything: (1) more personnel-1020 law enforcement
agents for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
other agencies, 200 Assistant United States Attorneys, and 340 clerical staff; (2) more aggressive law enforcement-creating 12 (later 13) regional prosecutorial task forces across the nation "to identify, investigate, and prosecute members of high-level drug trafficking enterprises,
and to destroy the operations of those organizations;" (3) more money-S127.5 million in
additional funding and a substantial reallocation of the existing $702.8 million budget from
prevention, treatment, and research programs to law enforcement programs; (4) more prison
bed space-the addition of 1260 beds at 11 federal prisons to accommodate the increase in
drug offenders to be incarcerated; (5) more stringent laws-a "legislative offensive designed to
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Legal scholars rarely pay much attention to Presidential rhetoric in
analyzing legal developments. But, in this situation, it would be a serious
mistake to disregard the tough talk and political posturing. Attitude,
above all else, drives the counterrevolution in criminal law and procedure. The idea that the end of "getting" drug traffickers justifies just
about any means seems an idea whose time has come. One federal judge,
in a 1977 opinion, adumbrated the evolving jurisprudence of hostility in
condemning drug dealers as "merchants of misery, destruction and
death" whose greed has wrought "hideous evil" and brought "unimaginable sorrow" upon the nation. He concluded his opinion by denouncing
drug crimes as "unforgivable."" 1 This attitude propels the trend toward
creating a drug "exception" to the law: if conduct is literally unforgivable, then draconian measures are justified.
In this Essay, I will draw a somewhat impressionistic sketch of the
emerging "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights and other protections of
individual liberties. Not only does the crackdown attitude penetrate
every aspect of the contemporary federal criminal justice system-legislation, adjudication, investigation, and prosecution-it also reaches into
lives of ordinary people not accused of crime. Ideas, after all, have
power.

I. The Social Context: Crackdown, Failure, and Frustration
To understand the power of the social forces at work in the War on
Drugs, it is critical to recognize that President Reagan (and later the
First Lady) did not try to impose a preachment from above upon an
indifferent public. Rather, they harnessed a preexisting momentum for a
crackdown on drugs. At the time of his 1982 declaration of War on
Drugs, some 3000 parents' groups had already organized nationwide
under the umbrella of the National Federation of Parents for Drug Free
Youth.1 2 Within the government, the pressures for Presidential action
had been building for some time. The Attorney General's Task Force on
Violent Crime had recommended "an unequivocal commitment to combating international and domestic drug traffic." 1 3 In the Senate, twentywin approval of reforms" with respect to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the exclusionary rule; (6) better interagency coordination-bringing together all federal law enforcement agencies in "a comprehensive attack on drug trafficking and organized crime" under a
Cabinet-level committee chaired by the Attorney General; and (7) improved federal-state coordination, including federal assistance to state agencies by training their agents.
11. United States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
12. Gonzales, The War on Drugs: A Special Report, PLAYBOY, Apr. 1982, at 134.
13.

ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 28

(1981). The call for the augmentation of drug enforcement resources was not unprecedented.
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eight Senators had banded together in the Drug Enforcement Caucus to
"establish drug enforcement as a Senate priority." 14 Finally, the House
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control had urged the President to "declare war on drugs." 15 The President did just that.
Energized by this hardening attitude toward illegal drugs, the Administration acted aggressively, mobilizing an impressive array of federal
bureaucracies and resources in a coordinated-although futile-attack
on the supply of illegal drugs, principally cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.
The Administration hired hundreds of drug agents and cut through bureaucratic rivalries like no Administration before it. It acted to streamline operations and force more cooperation among enforcement agencies.
It placed the FBI in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and gave it major drug enforcement responsibility for the first
time in history. 16 And, as the centerpiece of its prosecutorial strategy, it
fielded a network of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces in
17
thirteen "core" cities across the nation.
To stop drugs from entering the country, the Administration attempted to erect a contemporary antidrug version of the Maginot Line
with the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), a network designed to coordinate surveillance and interdiction efforts along
the entire coastline of the United States. As part of that initiative,
NNBIS floated radar balloons in the skies over Miami, the Florida Keys,
Under the Nixon Administration, a buildup in the size and scope of the federal drug enforcement bureaucracy also occurred. At the end of June 1968, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had 615 agents. By June 1970, this number had increased to over 900.
Legislation had also authorized the addition of at least 300 more agents during 1971. See
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4566, 4584.
14. U.S. SENATE, CHARTER OF SENATE DRUG ENFORCEMENT CAUCUS, 1982.
15. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, H.R. REP. No.
418, pts. 1-2, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1982). Congress has likened the drug smugglers to an
invading army, complete with generals, soldiers, and an armada that operates over the unpatrolled coastline and unmonitored airspace of the United States. See Note, FourthAmendment

and Posse ComitatusAct Restrictions on MilitaryInvolvement in FederalLaw Enforcement, 54
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 404, 417 & nn.140-42 (1986).
16. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.85(a), 0.102 (1986). Authority for federal drug law enforcement is
distributed among several agencies, including the DEA, the Customs Service, the Coast
Guard, the FBI, and the IRS. Supporting roles are played by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. See STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG
ABUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
74 (1982); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE BORDER

WAR ON DRUGS 33-39 (1987) [hereinafter BORDER WAR].

17. See Organized Crime DrugEnforcement Task Forces: Goals and Objectives, I1 DRUG
ENFORCEMENT 6 (1984); Maitland, President Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1982, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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and even the Bahamas to protect the nation's perimeter against drug
incursions."'
The CIA joined the war effort by supplying intelligence about foreign drug sources, and NASA assisted with satellite-based information
about coca and marijuana crops under cultivation. 19 The Administration
also initiated financial investigations, aided by computerized data banks
and staffed by Treasury agents specially trained to trace money laundering operations. 20 The State Department pressured foreign governments
to eradicate illegal coca and marijuana plants and financed pilot programs to provide peasant farmers with alternative cash crops. 21 Mutual
assistance treaties to expose "dirty" money secreted in tax haven nations
and to extradite defendants accused of drug conspiracies against the laws
22
of the United States were concluded.
The government also literally militarized what had previously been
only a rhetorical war by deploying the armed forces of the United States
in drug enforcement operations. The Department of Defense provided
pursuit planes, helicopters, and other equipment to civilian enforcement
agencies, while Navy E-2C "Hawkeye" radar planes patrolled the coastal
skies in search of smuggling aircraft and ships. 23 The Coast Guard, receiving new cutters and more personnel, intensified its customary task of
interdicting drug-carrying vessels at sea. Finally, for the first time in
American history, Navy vessels, including a nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier, interdicted-and in one case fired upon--drug smuggling ships
in international waters. 24 On a purely technical level, the Administration
could rightly claim success in focusing the resources of the federal gov18. See Gibson, Anti-Smuggling System Would Have CIA Links, Ft. Lauderdale News &
Sun-Sentinel, June 18, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 3.
19. See Coates & DeLama, Satellite Spying on Narcotics OperationsIs a Promising Tool
for Drug Task Force, Miami Herald, Jan. 23, 1983, at I 1A, col. 1.
20. For a description of Operation Greenback, the prototype money-laundering investigation, see FinancialInvestigation of Drug Trafficking: Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 65 (1981).
21. See InternationalNarcotics Control Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1982); InternationalNarcotics Trafficking: Hearings Before
the PermanentSubcomm. on Investigationsof the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 201-02 (1981).
22.

See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT:

DRUG ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED CRIME 412-19 (1986).

23. See Note, supra note 15, at 416-21, 427; Starita, Radar Planes to Hunt Drugs in S
Florida,Miami Herald, Mar. 13, 1982, at IB, col. 5; infra notes 137-40 and accompanying

text.
24. Stein, Naval Task Force Enlists in Drug War, Miami Herald, Aug. 24, 1983, at 13A,
col. 4; Balmaseda, Navy Bullets Riddle Pot-Smuggling Ship, Miami Herald, July 17, 1983, at
IA, col. 5.
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emiment in an historically large and single-minded attack on the drug

supply.
What were the results of this extraordinary enforcement program?
It set new records in every category of measurement-drug seizures, investigations, indictments, arrests, convictions, and asset forfeitures. 25
Yet, despite the Administration's accumulation of impressive statistics,
the black market in drugs, especially cocaine, has grown to record size.
This rapid market growth occurred in the face of President Reagan's
doubling and redoubling of the federal antidrug enforcement budget
from $645 million in fiscal year 1981 to over $4 billion in fiscal year
1987.26 This budgetary expansion seemsall the more remarkable when
compared to the equivalent budget for fiscal year 1969 of $73.5 million. 27
The social "return" on the extra billions spent during that time has been
a drug abuse problem of historic magnitude, accompanied by a drug trafficking parasite of international dimensions. A web of black market
pathologies, including cocaine cowboy killings, corruption of public officials, and subversive "narcoterrorist" alliances between Latin American
guerrillas and drug traffickers, feed on the mega-billions circulating in
28
the drug underworld.
Of course, all of this was and is utterly predictable. The attack on
the drug supply through an aggressive program of enforcement at each
step-interdiction, arrest, prosecution, and punishment-results in what
Professor Herbert Packer has called a "crime tariff."' 29 The crime tariff is
what the seller must charge the buyer in order to monetize the risk he
takes in breaking the law. The criminal law thereby maintains hyperinflated prices for illegal drugs in the black market. For example, a $2-$3
25. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE PROGRAM 102-03 (1984).
26. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL: BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS, FY 1986-FY1988

[IP334D] (Feb. 27, 1987). Earlier this year, the Office of Technology Assessment concluded:
Despite a doubling of Federal expenditures on interdiction over the past five years,
the quantity of drugs smuggled into the United States is greater than ever.... There
is no clear correlation between the level of expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction and the long-term 'availability of illegally imported drugs in the domestic
market.
BORDER WAR, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
27. SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
2 CONGRESSIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL EFFORT ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL 250 (Comm. Print 1976).
28. See Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility andDestructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 1306, 1395-1423; see also Shell, How to Lose the Coke War, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1987, at 22.
29. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 277-82 (1968).
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gram of pure pharmaceutical cocaine becomes a $80-$100 gram of 35
percent street cocaine. This type of law enforcement succeeds to some
unknown extent in making drugs less available-to the extent that demand is elastic or sensitive to price. But it also pumps vast sums of
money into the black market, as much as $100 billion per year. 30 The
flow of these illegal billions through the underground economy generates
pernicious pathologies that harm the security and well-being of the
nation.
Confronted by these threatening developments, both the public and
the politicians predictably react in fear and anger. The specter of uncontrolled and uncontrollable drug abuse and black marketeering leads to
frustrated reaction against the drug trade. The zeal to "turn the screw"
on the "merchants of misery, destruction and death" 3 1 leads directly to
the adoption of stringent, punitive measures that aggrandize governmental powers at the expense of individual liberties.
This reactive, almost reflexive growth of governmental power and
the correlative squelching of personal liberty are the framework for the
next sections of this Essay. It focuses on two closely related if not inseparable phenomena: (1) the government's sustained attack, motivated by
the perceived imperatives of drug enforcement, on traditional protections
afforded to criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights, and (2) the
gradual but perceptible rise of "Big Brotherism" against the public at
large in the form of investigative detentions, eavesdropping, surveillance,
monitoring, and other intrusive enforcement methods.
II.

The Assault on Justice

A. The Legislative Offensive
In his original declaration of War on Drugs, President Reagan announced a "legislative offensive designed to win approval of reforms"
with respect to bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, and the exclusionary
rule.32 He succeeded in almost every respect. The Administration's
march toward a tougher set of investigative and prosecutorial powers
drew much of its energy from the widespread belief that the criminal
justice system was treating drug traffickers with excessive leniency. For
example, in 1981 the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
30. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTIcS ABUSE AND CONTROL, ANNUAL REPORT
FOR THE YEAR 1984, H.R. REP. No. 1199, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1985).
31.
32.

United States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
Radio Address, supra note 9, at 1249.
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Florida (Miami) articulated that perception in a written statement to the
Attorney General:
Currently, a first time offender associated with multiton quantities
of marihuana, kilogram quantities of cocaine or tens of thousands of
methaqualone tablets expects: not to be arrested; if arrested, to be immediately set free on bail pending trial; if tried to have representation
by the best lawyers money can buy; if convicted, to remain free on bail
pending appeals, all the way to the Supreme Court; if eventually sentenced, to receive a sentence of two, to three years and to serve less
than 10 months in "a clean well-lighted place" (perhaps even receive
probation); and, when released after a few months
in prison, to have
33
millions of dollars in narcotics profits waiting.
In short, the system was too soft in every respect. What was needed,
according to this view, was a toughening of all phases of the criminal
justice system, from investigation and pretrial procedure to sentencing
and the appellate stages of a prosecution. The goal of the crackdown was
to make the system more effective in catching drug violators, to facilitate
their conviction once indicted, and to punish them more severely upon
conviction. According to this theory, publicity about the heightened certainty of conviction and the greater severity of punishment would deter
others from trafficking in drugs. The drug supply would diminish and
drug abuse would therefore decline. In other words, extending, expanding, and intensifying the existing system of enforcement would correct the failures of the past, and the drug control system would finally
begin to work effectively.
However simple-minded the analysis, it seemed to coincide with
common sense and soon prevailed. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
representatives of the DEA, Customs, and other enforcement agencies
came before congressional committees and repeated the theme. Drug
traffickers had a free hand because enforcement agencies were underfunded, understaffed, and underequipped. Not only that, the agencies
were hampered by excessively restrictive laws that tied,their hands in the
fight against drug violators. Representative Hutto, for example, complained that federal law conferred too many protections upon potential
defendants: "[I]n the war on narcotics, we have met the enemy, and he is
the U.S. Code. I have never seen such a maze of laws and hangups
...."34 Legal obstacles to efficient investigative action needed to be re33. InternationalNarcotics Trafficking: HearingsBefore the PermanentSubcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 389 (1981)
(testimony of Atlee Wampler, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida).
34. FinancialInvestigation of Drug Trafficking: HearingsBefore the House Select Comm.
on NarcoticsAbuse and Control, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1981) (statement of Congressman
Hutto).

July 1987]

CRACKDOWN

moved. The entire Congress apparently shared that perception, becoming
a prolific source of antidrug initiatives. In just the first year of the
Ninety-seventh Congress, over one hundred bills proposing to "reform"
some aspect of the criminal justice system were filed; more than threefourths specifically proposed harsher treatment for drug offenses or drug
offenders. 35 Most of the bills concentrated on restricting bail for accused
drug offenders, followed in frequency by proposals for mandatory or
more severe sentences for convicted drug traffickers.
To facilitate conviction of those arrested, two bills proposed to eliminate the exclusionary rule. 36 Two others proposed to dilute the rule by

adopting a "good faith exception" to the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement, 37 a step partially taken in a drug case by the Fifth Circuit
39
Court of Appeals 38 and later by the United States Supreme Court.
Other proposals sought to toughen the laws on asset forfeiture4° and the
reporting requirements of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. 4 1 Congress actually succeeded in curtailing restrictions on
the use of the military forces in drug interdiction under the Posse Comitatus Act 42 and loosened the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to facilitate disclo43
sure of IRS file information to other enforcement agencies.
Apart from the sheer number of proposed laws, this legislative activity was noteworthy for its manifestation of a "get-tough, do-whatever-isnecessary" attitude. In its most reasonable form, legislators voiced the
matter as one of creating disincentives, of raising the ante. They would
make the drug business riskier and therefore less attractive "by significantly increasing the risk of conviction and certainty of long prison
sentences." 44 The crackdown showed its most pugnacious mentality in
the proposed Arctic Penitentiary Act, which proposed creating "an
35.

Information on these bills was provided by the office of former Senator Paula Haw-

kins (R.-FIa.). A survey of the contents of these bills, along with particular Senate or House
numbers, appears in Wisotsky, supra note 28, at 1386-88.
36. H.R. 4259, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 17,251 (1981); S. 751, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 4760 (1981).
37. H.R. 4606, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2107 (1981); S. 101, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 282 (1981).
38. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
39. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
40. E.g., H.R. 4398, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 19,566 (1981); S. 1126, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 8613 (1981).
41. See, e.g., H.R. 5048, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 28,258 (1981); S. 1907,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 29,547 (1981).
42. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (1982); 32 C.F.R. § 213 (1986). See generally Note, supra note
15.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i) (1983).
44.

Sentencing Practicesand Alternatives in Narcotics Cases: HearingsBefore the House
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American Gulag" of remote prison camps for drug offenders.4 5 So intense was the legislative activity that one could fairly say that drug enforcement became the top priority, indeed the organizing focus, of the
entire federal criminal justice system. And, in its zeal to shore up the
sagging system, Congress did not hesitate to attack the "enemy." If the
Bill of Rights, tradition, or statutory protections stood in the way of the
war effort, then they had to go.
After the initial flurry of activity in the 1981-1983 period, the legislative offensive produced an even more aggressive and effective assault on
justice in the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
(CCC Act). 46 This Act marked an historic rollback of the rights of those
accused of crime. The accused first feels the impact of the Act soon after
arrest on drug charges when he applies for pretrial release. The courts
had previously "upped the ante" in this area by restricting the use of cash
bonds through Nebbia hearings. 4 7 Devised in response to cases in which
defendants had posted large cash bonds and then absconded, Nebbia permitted the court to interrogate a defendant about the source of his bail
money and to reject drug money or any cash bond when it did not provide adequate assurance that a defendant would appear for trial. 4 8 Nevertheless, the traditional legal test for release on bond remained intact:
whether a released defendant would appear for trial.
The CCC Act broke with tradition and precedent in authorizing
pretrial detention. This law dispenses with pretrial release altogether for
most charges under the Controlled Substances Act if the court finds at a
hearing "clear and convincing" evidence that no conditions of a defendant's release would reasonably ensure the safety of any other person or of
the community. But the CCC Act also creates a rebuttable presumption
of a defendant's dangerousness upon a judicial finding of "probable cause
to believe that the person committed an offense ... [under] the Con49
trolled Substances Act" punishable by ten years or more in prison.
Since an indictment is predicated upon probable cause, it seems that the
judicial finding of probable cause could be pro forma for defendants arSelect Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) (statement of
Representative Beard (R.-Tenn.)).
45. H.R. 7112, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 7088 (1982).
46. Pub. L. No. 98-473 tit. II, ch. 1, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142 (Supp. 1986)).
47. See United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 304.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 1986). The Controlled Substances Act is codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 801-970 (Supp. 1987).
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rested after indictment.5 0 Thus, any ten-year drug charge alone can justify pretrial detention. But there is no "rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, ' 5 1 that is, between a finding
of probable cause to believe a defendant has committed a ten-year drug
felony and the presumption that detention is necessary to ensure the
safety of others.
The potency of the preventive detention provision in the CCC Act
showed up in its early track record: between October 12, 1984, and May
10, 1985, the Department of Justice won 704 motions for pretrial detention and lost only 185.52 More than pretrial liberty is lost in such cases; a
defendant's statistical chances of securing an acquittal suffer greatly from
pretrial detention.5 3 At this writing, constitutional challenges to the law
have produced conflicting rulings by several circuit courts of appeal. The
Second Circuit has twice declared part of the statute unconstitutional, 54
while other circuits have rejected constitutional attacks.5 5 The Second
Circuit's ruling in United States v. Salerno was reversed by the Supreme
Court, although it did not involve the dubious statutory question discussed above.5 6 However, when the Supreme Court finally rules on the
validity of the presumption, the Act's authorization of pretrial detention
marks an historic shift in attitude about the rights of those accused of
crime.
Under the CCC Act, greater restrictions now apply to post-conviction bail as well. Formerly, courts granted bail pending appeal liberally
unless the government could show that a defendant was likely to flee or
posed a danger to others.5 7 The CCC Act shifts the burden on this issue
to the defendant. It also requires that a convicted defendant be detained
unless his appeal "raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to
50. See United States v. Volksen, 766 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1985).
51. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943), reviewed in Ulster County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-63 and Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-46.
52. Kennedy, Foreword to Symposium on the Crime Control Act of 1984, 22 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. vi, viii n.4 (1985).
53. See Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641 (1964).
54. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (pretrial detention under
§ 31421(e) violates due process clause); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984,
1000-05 (2d Cir. 1986) (8-month pretrial detention on grounds of dangerousness violated due
process clause).
55. United States v. Walker, 808 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rodriguez,
803 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 112-18 (3d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390
(3d Cir. 1985).
56. United States v. Salerno, 55 U.S.L.W. 4463 (May 26, 1987).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (Supp. 1986).
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58
result in reversal or an order for a new trial."
One of the most serious incursions into the rights of criminal defendants arises from the Department of Justice's tactic of using the crimi-

nal forfeiture provisions of the CCC Act 59 against fees paid to defense
counsel. When so used, prosecutors claim that the fee received by counsel represents derivative contraband, in other words, the proceeds of a
controlled substances violation. 60 Upon conviction of the client, the government asks the court to order the fee forfeited to the United States
under the relation-back doctrine that legal ownership of property derived from unlawful activity vests in the government at the time of the
criminal act. 6 1 Since very few cases result in complete acquittal of defendants charged in multicount drug conspiracy indictments, defense
counsel confront a thorny problem. Preparation and trial of a major
drug conspiracy case typically take months of concentrated work. Even
if one agrees that defense lawyers have come to expect excessive fees in
drug cases, the prospect of no fee at all is an extreme curative. Even more
extreme action results from pretrial orders prohibiting a defendant from
transfering funds to retain counsel in the first instance. 62

Forfeiture of fees seriously cranks the balance wheel of justice in the
government's favor. It hurts defendants by discouraging experienced attorneys from working on such cases, and by diverting energy of counsel
from defense of the substantive charge to defense of the fee. 63 In fact, the
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) (Supp. 1987); see United States v. Price, 773 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ballone, 762 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir. 1985). The CCC Act also
"ups the ante" in sentencing. First, it raises the maximum term of imprisonment for many
drug offenses, including one kilo or more of cocaine, to 20 years and increases the maximum
fine tenfold to $250,000. Second, it provides a powerful stick for the collection of fines through
devices such as imprisonment for willful failure to pay the fine. Third, it provides for an
alternative fine of twice the gross gain of the drug deal or other crime. Fourth, it adds forfeiture, formerly limited to CCE and RICO offenses, as a penalty for all felony violations of the
Controlled Substances Act. Upon conviction (in addition to fines), the government acquires
title to any "property used or intended to be used" to facilitate commission of a drug violation
and any money or property, including land, that was obtained directly or indirectly through
such violation. Money or property realized by forfeitures goes to a law enforcement fund for
use in paying informers, rewarding state and local enforcement agencies, and a variety of other
purposes.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1987).
60. See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (slip opinion Mar. 6, 1987)
and cases cited therein.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1987).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) (1981); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1981).
63. While it would be easy to overdramatize the impact of the assault on defense counsel,
it has succeeded already in driving out one of Miami's most highly regarded drug defense
lawyers, "Diamond" Joel Hirschhorn. In announcing his retirement from drug cases, Mr.
Hirschhorn cited both the stigma of drug defense and the threat to fees: "It's just not worth
the aggravation to represent major drug dealers. The government comes after your fees. It's
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potential for forfeiture effectively converts the fee arrangement to a contingent fee, which, ironically, the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits in criminal cases. 64
While the Department of Justice has issued guidelines 65 to constrain
prosecutorial discretion, and some courts have declared fee forfeiture unconstitutional, 66 the validity of attorney's fee forfeitures under the right
to counsel clause of the sixth amendment remains unresolved. Whatever
the final resolution of the issue, the attempt to apply forfeiture to attorneys' fees is most noteworthy for what it reveals about the attitude of the
forces of justice in the War on Drugs. Consider, for example, the rather
cavalier position toward the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to
assistance of counsel taken by two representatives of the Department of
Justice:
If all of the defendant's ill-gotten gains are subject to forfeiture, then
any fees paid from illegal sources are appropriately included. Under
the Constitution, defendants are entitled to legal advice, not to high
priced67advice. Moreover, such advice cannot be paid for by ill-gotten
gains.

The superficial logic of this argument ignores fundamental questions.
How can the law justify isolating those accused of drug offenses from all
other defendants for this special treatment? Does not the "ill-gotten
gains" logic apply with equal force to tax evasion, bank robbery, or almost any other offense? If taken to the full extent of its logic, the government's rationale would mean that no criminal defendant could retain
private counsel without first proving that he has an "untainted" source of
money to pay the fee. Forfeiture of defense fees stacks the deck against
the defense by effectively requiring that drug defendants be represented
by public defenders with limited resources and excessive case loads.
What, after all, is the point of such a rule except to tilt the scales of
justice by weakening an accused's ability to defend himself?
The hostility reflected in the attempt to forfeit attorney's fees in
drug cases shows up in other assaults on the attorney-client relationship,
not worth it.... I'm doing tax fraud. And I like to do one murder case a year. It's OK to
represent a murderer. Everyone approves of that." Tasker, Miami Herald, Aug. 23, 1985, at
BI, col. 1.
64. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR2-106(c) (1987); see also id.
EC2-20 ("Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases ....
11).

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-111.400, at 9 (1986).
66. In United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987) the court held forfeiture of attorney's fees violated "the qualified right to counsel of choice secured by the sixth
amendment."
67. DiGenova & Belfiore, An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1984-

65.

The Prosecutor'sPerspective, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 707, 717 (1985).
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such as the government's frequent use of subpoenas against defendants'
lawyers to obtain information and records harmful to their clients. This

scenario occurs in a variety of ways, all involving the government's efforts to convert defense lawyers into sources of information against their
own clients. The process frequently starts with a grand jury subpoena
compelling defense counsel to disclose the amount, source, and method
of payment of the fee received, 68 information that the courts generally
deem not protected by the confidentiality of the attorney-client privi-

lege. 69 Thus, attorneys must testify or turn over the subpoenaed records
to avoid contempt sanctions. A defendant's knowledge that his lawyer is
giving potentially incriminating testimony to a grand jury certainly casts
a pall over the attorney-client relationship 7° and may ultimately require
the lawyer to disqualify himself as defense counsel. If new counsel is
retained, however, the grand jury could begin the process all over again
ad infinitum.
In some cases the government has exercised its power to pit the de-

fense lawyer even more directly against his client as a witness. For example, under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, the government must
prove that the defendant derived "substantial income" from a series of
drug violations. 7 1 By subpoenaing defense counsel to testify as to the
amount of his retainer, the government may attempt to prove the element of income. The lawyer thus is converted into a witness against his
own client, who will often become a former client, since withdrawal is
required when the lawyer's "testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client."' 72 One of the nation's leading criminal defense lawyers calls this
"reprehensible" and "disastrous":
68. See Hedges, River Cops Attorneys Fight Grand Jury Call, Miami Herald, Apr. 17,
1987, at 1A, col. 5.
69. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
("[Miatters involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged.") (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (To
require "that the government show its need for the [fee] information sought and that the attorney is the only source of the information would hamper severely the investigatory function of
the grand jury, if not stop the grand jury 'dead in its tracks.' "), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515
(1986).
70. In re Special Grand Jury (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1982).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B) (1987).
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1987). The Department of Justice has adopted internal guidelines to govern the issuance of subpoenas to attorneys. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (1985); see Note, A Critical
Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense
Attorneys, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145. The Department disclaims any intent to drive a wedge between attorney and client in issuing subpoenas. Letter from W. Landers, Deputy Associate
Attorney General, to American Bar Association (Dec. 12, 1986).
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When the lawyer is a witness called by the prosecution, there is
actual prejudice to the client. Even a mere production of the attorIn either cirney's records is counter to the defendant's interest ....
cumstance, whether the attorney is called as a witness or whether the
records are subpoenaed, the attorney becomes a witness for the prosecution or a witness for the defense. Because the attorney's testimony is
directed to a material element of the offense, it seems that withdrawal
is mandated. The next step is painfully obvious. There appears to be
an unlimited
discretion within the government to select the defendant's
73
counsel.

For these reasons, the CCC Act is perceived by many defense lawyers as "one of the most threatening steps yet taken by Court or Congress against traditional attorney-client relationships." 74 Yet things can
always get worse, and worsen they did in the most recent escalation of
the War on Drugs embodied in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 75
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act further impairs the attorney-client relationship by creating new offenses of (1) money laundering 7 6 and (2)
knowingly engaging in monetary transactions exceeding $10,000 in property derived from "specified unlawful activity. ' 77 Because of its mens rea
requirement, the first of these provisions arguably does not create the
chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship that led the American
Bar Association to pass a resolution expressing its concern about the
78
latter.
Quite apart from its impact on the attorney-client relationship, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 epitomizes the spirit of crackdown that
forms the theme of this Essay. In the summer of 1986, Washington was
in "a frenzy over drugs" with Democrats and Republicans racing to
73. Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 737, 742-43 (1985); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238,
249-50 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("We are sensitive to the need to prevent an arbitrary and
unnecessary disqualification of an attorney. We hold, however, that the potentially competing
interests at stake concerning disqualification should be examined at the pretrial stage, not the
grand jury stage.").
74. Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 73, at 743. Congress drove yet another wedge
between lawyer and client in a provision of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-369,
98th Cong., 2 Sess. (1984) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (1984)). It requires that attorney's
fees of more than $10,000 in cash must be reported to the IRS on Form 8300 along with the
name, address, and tax number of the person who paid the fee. The very filing of the form puts
the client, who may not have been charged with any crime, at risk of investigation.
75. Pub. L. No. 99-570, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN NEWS (No. 10A)
(codified as amended in scatered sections of U.S.C.).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. 1987).
77. Id. § 1957.
78. American Bar Ass'n Resolution No. 110A (1987), reprinted in SUMMARY OF AcTION, HOUSE OF DELEGATES MID-YEAR MEETING 18 (1987).
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"outperform" one another. 79 In this environment, the House of Representatives put together a hastily drafted, multibillion dollar antidrug bill
that contained extreme measures, including a subsequently deleted death
penalty for certain drug-related deaths.
The bill that finally became law casts a wide net in its fifteen titles.
Among other things, it imposes some of the severest penalties in the
United States Code, including mandatory minimum prison sentences.
For example, the Act provides minimum penalties of five and ten years in
prison depending upon drug and weight involved: possession with intent
to distribute five kilograms of cocaine commands a minimum penalty of
ten years to life.80 Even five grams of cocaine base requires not less than
five years, and up to a maximum of forty years in prison.81 In both cases,
the range rises to a minimum of twenty years to life if death or serious
bodily injury results from the use of such substances. These penalties
apply to "first time drug offenders;" a defendant with a prior state or
federal drug conviction receives a mandatory life term under these circumstances. A life term is also mandatory for an individual defendant
convicted of a continuing criminal enterprise if specific weight thresholds
are crossed or if gross receipts exceed from the proscribed activities $4
82
million within one year.
These are very severe penalties, more stringent in fact that sentences
typically meted out to first-time robbers or rapists. The combination of
very long maximum terms of imprisonment and mandatory minimum
terms arguably takes the government to the edge of its power, trenching
upon the limits imposed by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment.
In Solem v. Helm, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
"principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is
'8 3
deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.
It explicitly rejected "the State's assertion that the general principle of
proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences."8 4 The Court
found "meritless" the dictum in Rummell v. Estelle that "'the length of
79.

Buckley, FightingNarcoticsIs Everyone's Issue Now, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1986, § 4,

at 1.

80. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1986).
81. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
82. Id. § 848(a).
83. 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). Helm had been convicted of six nonviolent felonies before
1979, when he was convicted of uttering a "no account" check for $100 and was punished
under the South Dakota's recidivist statute.sentenced to life in prison By statute, a life sentence carried no possibility of parole, although executive clemency remained a possibility. The
United States Supreme Court struck down Helm's sentence on eighth amendment grounds.
84. Id. at 290.
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sentence imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.' "85
The Helm Court identified three "objective factors" to be considered
by courts in determining whether a particular sentence is disproportionately severe: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
86
jurisdictions.
At a bare minimum, Helm establishes that Congress is not free to
impose whatever penalty it chooses on drug offenders. The imposition of

prison terms is limited by a legal principle of proportionality. Determining when that line has been crossed is an exceedingly subtle task, and this
Essay will not engage in the extended analysis required by the Helm criteria. They call out for a Brandeis brief on the actual harms resulting

from the various drugs in relation to the harms caused by other crimes.
Perhaps this issue of ultra-severe penalties will reach the Supreme
Court, 87 along with the related issue of the validity of mandatory minimum sentencing of first offenders, 88 but the prospects for judicial relief
85. Id. at 288 n.14 (quoting Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)). In Rummell,
the Court held that a mandatory life sentence for three petty theft offenses imposed pursuant
to a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the eighth amendment. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Rummel was followed in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
86. Helm, 463 U.S. at 292.
87. Some desparate challenges on poor facts have produced poor results in the courts of
appeal. In United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1986), the court cursorily rejected
the defendant's challenge to a life sentence without parole for conviction of CCE (Continuing
Criminal Enterprise), plus consecutive sentences for RICO and predicate acts for both CCE
and RICO. In United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1026-29 (4th Cir. 1985), the court
upheld 50 and 75 year sentences for CCE convictions, taking a very restrictive view of Helm.
The court in United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1984), engaged in an extended
proportionality review under Helm and upheld a 60-year sentence for CCE violation on the
ground that it was "the most serious of all drug related offenses proscribed in Title 21," id. at
1527, and because the defendants had threatened to kill or maim hostages.
These CCE convictions were poor candidates for effective constitutional challenge. By
contrast, in Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,423 U.S. 993
(1975), the court held that minimum terms of 10 years for possession of marijuana and 20
years for sale of marijuana were "excessive in length and disproportionate to the nature of the
offense for which he was convicted." Id. at 1292. Contra Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405,
412-17 (2d Cir. 1978).
88. In United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985), the court reversed the
imposition of the maximum 5-year sentence on defendants who pleaded guilty to participating
in a shipment of marijuana that was part of a large and protracted marijuana smuggling operation. (The government had recommended sentences of 12 to 18 months.) The court cited
Helm in observing that "the concept of individualized sentencing is firmly entrenched in our
jursiprudence." Id. at 1365.
The issue of proportionality is thus closely related to the issue of mandatory sentencing.
The leading state case invalidating mandatory drug sentences is People v. Lorentzen, 387
Mich. 167, 181, 194 N.W.2d 827, 834 (Mich. 1972) ("A compulsory prison sentence of 20
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from legislative overreaching are not good.
The "turn the screw" quotation that begins this Essay comes from a
case in which the Court upheld consecutive sentences of imprisonment
for a single agreement to import marijuana on the ground that it violated
two separate conspiracy statutes. 89 The Court held that Congress intended to authorize "double" punishment, "in effect determin[ing] that a
conspiracy to import drugs and to distribute them is twice as serious as a
conspiracy to do either object singly." 90 The Court also rejected the petitioner's double jeopardy clause argument on the rather expansive ground
that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible
is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative
Branch intended.., to be imposed. Where Congress intended to impose
multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the
Constitution." 9 1 Although three Justices distanced themselves from that
assertion in a concurring opinion, there were no dissents. The decision
not only reflects the crackdown attitude of the courts; it also reflects the
positivist idea that laws are valid simply because they have been enacted.
Disproportionate and mandatory sentencing statutes will not face a serious challenge if they are reviewed from this perspective.
One last thing should be said about these various offensives against
defendants in drug cases. When viewed in isolation, each measure may
arguably be reasonable. But their cumulative impact appears calculated
to render an accused drug offender as helpless as possible to mount a
successful defense and to subject him to stringent punishment following
the almost inevitable conviction. The prevailing attitude seems to be that
drug defendants deserve the worst treatment meted out by the system,
and that indictments should be easy to obtain and to prove. More stringent substantive laws, less effective procedural protections-in short,
more governmental power and less individual liberty-are seen as the
prescription for the ills of drug abuse and drug trafficking. Actions carried out under this paradigm dishonor the tradition of limited government and, in the case of pretrial detention and fee forfeiture, nibble away
years for a non-violent crime [sale of marijuana] imposed without consideration for Defendant's individual personality and history is so excessive that it 'shocks the conscience.' "). To
similar effect is In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 53 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976), in which the
California Supreme Court struck down a mandatory minimum term of 10 years without eligibility for parole for the sale of marijuana imposed upon a repeat offender. The social context
has shifted since these cases were decided, but the principle of individualized sentencing remains viable.
89. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, (1981) (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963).
90.

Id. at 343.

91.

Id. at 344.
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at the spirit of "the bedrock, axiomatic and elementary principle" 92 embodied in the presumption of innocence. The new regime pays little deference to tradition or principle, justifying departures from constitutional
protections on the grounds of a drug "crisis." In this single-minded dedication to "getting" drug violators, the end has come to justify most any
means. Worse, since the overall effect on the drug supply is de minimis,
the only real point of these heavy-handed methods is their symbolic
statement-in response to societal anger about drugs, the government
reserves its nastiest procedures, its most potent legal weapons, for drug
cases. Is this not a form of scapegoating? Do not drug dealers in the
1980s occupy a political-legal status similar to that of Communists or
"subversives" in the 1950s? 93
B. The Judicial Rollback
In the past three or four decades, those whose rights were damaged
by legislative or prosecutorial excesses could generally turn to the federal courts for protection. But the War on Drugs steamroller has flattened judicial barriers as well. In case after case, the courts have whittled
away vital protections for the accused. This process has reached its apogee in the realm of search and seizure. The individual's right to be free
from unlawful searches and seizures conflicts directly with the inherent
intrusiveness of drug enforcement techniques such as wiretaps and the
use of informants and undercover agents. Historically, drug enforcement
has precipitated a tug-of-war between the government's search and
seizure powers and the privacy rights of individuals. This conflict has
shaped the contours of contemporary fourth amendment jurisprudence
in a decisive way.
In recent years especially, the courts have almost always upheld the
government. The Supreme Court's 1982-1983 term was marked by "the
overwhelming importance of the Fourth Amendment in drug cases."' 94
In almost all of these cases, even when particular convictions were reversed, the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the enforcement techniques of the drug agencies, upholding the power of drug agents to use
the airport drug courier profile to stop, detain, and question citizens
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
93. Of course, obvious differences separate drug dealers from those who merely advocate
an unpopular ideology. The analogy, however, makes the point that drug dealers today have
become as much a magnet for the fears and suspicions of the public as the "subversives" of the
McCarthy era. See E. EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR (1979) (arguing that President Nixon's
War on Drugs substituted drugs for subversives during 1971 to exploit public fears for political
ends).
94. Supreme Court's Term, 52 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S. Sept. 13, 1983).
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without probable cause;95 to subject a traveller's luggage to a sniffing examination by drug-detector dogs without probable cause;9 6 to make warrantless searches of automobiles and closed containers therein; 97 to
conduct surveillance of suspects by placing transmitters or beepers in
containers in vehicles; 98 to search at will ships in inland waterways; 99 and
to obtain a search warrant based on an -undisclosed informant's tip.100
The Supreme Court adopted a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule for searches made pursuant to a warrant issued without
probable cause10 1 and authorized warrantless searches of "open fields"
and barns adjacent to a residence. 10 2 The Court significantly enlarged
the powers of police to stop, question, and detain drivers of vehicles on
the highways on suspicion less than probable cause' 0 3 or with no suspicion at all at fixed checkpoints or roadblocks.' 0 4 The Court also validated warrantless aerial surveillance over private property, 0 5- the
warrantless search of a motor home occupied as a residence, 0 6 and the
warrantless search of the purse of a public school student.'0 7 In the
95. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); see also United States v. Montoya, 473
U.S. 531 (1985); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984). Drug courier profiles vary from
airport to airport, but all are based on an informal compilation of common traits associated
with drug smugglers; they have been criticized for allowing impermissible intrusions on fourth
amendment rights based solely on an agent's "hunch." See Note, Drug CourierProfiles in
Airport Stops, 14 S.U.L. REV. 315, 316-17 & n.12 (1984). For further criticisms, see Note,
Search and Seizure: Defining the Outer Boundariesof the "Drug CourierProfile," 17 CREIGHTON L. RaV. 973 (1984); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-The Supreme Court FurtherDefines the
Scope of the FourthAmendment Protectionsin Airport Drug Stops, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 32
(1984).
96. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983).
97. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S.
Ct. 738 (1987).
98. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
99. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983).
100. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates rejected the principles of probable cause
determination established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), in favor of a more loosely structured "totality of the circumstances" test. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
101. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984). To similar effect are Illinois v.
Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), and Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987). For criticism
of the good faith exception, see 1 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3(c)-(d), at 51, 58-59 (1987) (arguing that the Leon Court overestimated the costs of adherence to the exclusionary rule based on "intuition, hunches, and occassional pieces of partial and often inconclusive data").
102. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987) (barn); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170 (1984) (open fields).
103. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
104. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
105. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986).
106. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
107. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
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realm of search and seizure, the government won almost every test case
in the Supreme Court. 10 The government also made very substantial
inroads in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, probably
the nation's leading "drug circuits" as a result of their southern coastal
locations. 0 9
To question whether the government deserved in law to win these
cases misses the central point: such issues, presented within the relatively narrow scope of a criminal prosecution, are always debatable.
Case-by-case analysis obscures the larger social context: the government's relentless drive against the drug supply generates the pressures to
test and expand its enforcement powers. Moreover, when the Supreme
Court "balances" the collective interest in "effective" law enforcement
against the individual's interest in due process and personal liberty, the

right of privacy must generally lose out to the weightier social interest,
especially if there is a shared perception of a drug "epidemic." ' 0 The
Court has made the point explicitly: "The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal
profit."' The result of the War on Drugs is thus a gradual, but inexorable, expansion of enforcement powers at the expense of personal freedoms. The United States is measurably a less free society than it was five
or six years ago.
During this time, defense lawyers have begun to joke nervously
108. For "pro-defendant" rulings, see Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (police
could not without probable cause, pursuant to the plain view doctrine, move stereo to find
serial number to determine whether it was stolen); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, (1985)
(could not, without probable cause or arrest warrant, forcibly take a person from his home to
the police station to be fingerprinted); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (proposed surgery
to remove bullet from accused for evidence violated fourth amendment); and possibly
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987) (warrantless search of government employee's
office permitted under standard of "reasonableness under all circumstances").
109. See, ag., United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1050 (1984); United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983);
United States v. Jonas, 639 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Warren,
578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), modified, 612 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1983) ("We must balance the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion.... Respondent suggests that, absent some special law enforcement interest such as officer safety, a generalized
interest in law enforcement cannot justify an intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment
interests in the absence of probable cause. Our prior cases, however, do not support this
proposition.").
11. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980).
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about the "drug exception to the fourth amendment." Apparently, their
wry perception has some basis in reality, for the Supreme Court itself, in
one of its few recent rulings against the government in a drug case, was
moved to admit that "[t]hose suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to [fourth amendment] protection than those suspected of nondrug
offenses." 1 12 Despite this assertion by the Court, commentators have captured the essence of the general trend in articles such as The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment 113 and Another Victim of IllegalNarcotics:
The Fourth Amendment. 11 4 Even within Congress there has been some
concern. Peter Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
expressed his anger at the antidrug bill passed by the house on September
10, 1986: "We have been fighting the war on drugs, but now it seems to
me the attack is on the Constitution of the United States." 1 15
C. Beyond the Law
Is it fair to characterize these antidrug actions by the government as
desperate or mean-spirited trashing of the Constitution? In a strictly
positivist sense, of course, the new laws create their own legitimacy. But
when law becomes purely instrumental, when it loses its mooring in
precepts of fairness and fundamental rights, then the notion of the rule of
law degenerates into whatever majoritarian oppression commands a consensus at a given moment in history. Were not the Nuremberg Codes of
1933 a parliamentary product? Does not South Africa today obey its
own laws in matters of race? Legitimacy does not follow automatically
from legal existence alone. On the contrary, the American political-constitutional tradition draws heavily upon the "self evident" truth that all
men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with "inalienable rights," no matter what the law is. An act of the legislature "contrary to the great first principles of the social compact cannot be
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." 116 By contrast,
the War on Drugs has taken us a long way toward repudiating this En117
lightenment-based Jeffersonian-transmitted natural rights tradition.
112. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984).
113. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking FourthAmendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
257 (1983).
114. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The FourthAmendment, 48 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 1 (1986).

115. National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington Digest, Sept. 15,
1986.
116. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387-88 (1798).
117. See generally Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 703 (1975).
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In doing so, the War on Drugs has set in motion forces that society may
someday regret, forces pointing toward an "Endarkenment" in legal
thought and practice. Already, anecdotal evidence suggests that the disrespectful attitude toward individual rights fostered by the War on
Drugs-the idea of a "drug exception" to the criminal law-has seeped
into the public consciousness:
3 FAKE POLICE OFFICERS RANSACK HOME

At about 8 a.m. Friday, a 27-year old woman thought she noticed a car
following her as she drove home on Bird Road after dropping her two
children off at a junior high school on Coral Way.
"She decided to pull off the road to see if the car would pass her,"
[Detective] McDermott said.
The car pulled up behind her and three casually dressed men got
out. They brandished handguns and identified themselves as police.
"They got into her car with her," McDermott said. "She said
they flashed some kind of badge.. .."
The men drove the woman to her house, where they handcuffed
her and her husband.
"They just said they were police and they were there to search the
place and they proceeded to handcuff the couple and ransack the
place," McDermott said. "Her husband asked them if they had a
search warrant and they said, 'We don't need one, we work in the drug
department.' "118
The idea that those enforcing the drug laws need not abide by the
ordinary rules of the game leads easily to abusive enforcement practices.
Of course, abusive enforcement, like beauty, is often in the eye of the
beholder. One's view of the importance of the drug enforcement enterprise tends to color one's judgment about the legitimacy of enforcement
tools. But when the Miami Herald,one of the principal advocates of the
War on Drugs, editorializes against "Drug War Overkill," the transgression must be gross:
Judge Jose Gonzalez admonished U.S. marshals for seizing a $3.5-million Martin County resort without first seeking a Federal-court hearing. Prosecutors asserted that the Manatee Resort had been purchased
with drug profits, but the owner had not-and still hasn't-been
charged with any crime. In voiding the seizure, Judge Gonzalez noted
that "neither Congress nor the people intended that the Bill of Rights
be a fatality in the War on Drugs."' "19
In a more sinister vein, the pressure to "get" the drug kingpins and
their lawyers occasionally tempts drug agents to cross the boundaries of
118. Leen, 3 Fake Police Officers Ransack Home, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at B4, col.
1.
119. Drug War Overkill, Miami Herald, July 17, 1985, at A16, col. 1.
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ethical law enforcement practices into the domain of entrapment or
worse.
JUDGE CALLS AGENTS' TACTICS 'OUTRAGEOUS'

Citing "outrageous" misconduct by government agents, a U.S.
magistrate Wednesday sternly recommended dismissal of a 13-count
federal indictment against accused cocaine kingpin Harold Rosenthal.
U.S. Magistrate Peter Nimkoff accused under-cover Drug Enforcement Administration agents from Atlanta of trying last October
[1983] to trick defense attorney Alan Ross of Miami into making incriminating statements about an alleged jailbreak attempt by
Rosenthal.
When Ross refused to take the DEA's bait, Nimkoff ruled, Atlanta prosecutors then used a deceptive affidavit to get a search warrant to read privileged attorney-client letters between Rosenthal and
Ross.
DEA agents later told the court that a cell-mate of Rosenthal's
had told them that attorney Ross would furnish the money and cocaine for the escape. And so DEA agent Donald Carter, posing as a
friend of Rosenthal's, went to Ross' office in Miami Oct. 25 to talk
about the plot.
But every time Carter mentioned drugs and escape, Ross kept replying that he didn't want to know anything about it. Ross repeatedly
told Carter that all he did for Rosenthal was represent him in court.
And at his next meeting with Rosenthal, Ross blasted his client for
sending Carter to him.
Though rebuffed by Ross, Carter and federal prosecutors in Atlanta didn't give up. According to the file, they swore out an artfully
drafted affidavit, suggesting that Ross was involved in the escape plan
and avoiding mention of Ross' refusals, in order to get the search warrant to intercept Rosenthal's mail.
"It is as clear a misrepresentation of facts as ever there were,"
Ross argued to Nimkoff in June. "Their zeal has blinded them to the
parameters of decency."
Nimkoff ultimately agreed.
The prosecutors and agents "consistently and surreptitiously
sought to breach the attorney-client privilege," he ruled Wednesday,
calling the action "so outrageous" as to require dismissal. 120
Perhaps the attempt to ensnare Mr. Ross should be regarded as an aberrational case rather than a harbinger of things to come. On the other
hand, some form of enticement of defendants is more or less built into
the system of drug enforcement, varying only in its subtlety or blatancy.
The institutionalization of what the layperson might call "entrapment"
stems from the government's dependence on informants to make cases
against parties to a consensual transaction. Informants are paid in effect
120.

col. 5.

Doig, Judge CallsAgents' Tactics 'Outrageous,' Miami Herald, Sept. 20, 1984, at B1,
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to encourage or to "create" crime by facilitating drug deals that provide
occasion for agents to make an arrest. In the most blatant-but lawfulcases, the incentive system includes payment contingent upon the making of an arrest, 121 or worse, payment in proportion to the number of
kilos or the value of property seized. In effect, the system rewards free
lance drug "investigators."
An example of this type of entrepreneurship involves a woman who
"set up" at least forty men in South Florida. Her tactics included seducing an intended defendant and establishing a sexual relationship. After a
few weeks of gentle pressure, she would arrange a drug deal between her
reluctant "boyfriend" and drug enforcement agents. The "boyfriend"
would be busted, and the woman would get paid. Magistrate Peter
Nimkoff recorded his disapproval by recommending dismissal of cocaine
122
charges against a defendant victimized by this technique.
III.

The Growth of Big Brotherism

Perhaps the public at large has no interest in the malignant effects of
drug enforcement on criminal justice. After all, the attack on the rights
of criminal defendants in drug cases seems ordinarily to affect only an
alien "them"-those who inhabit the drug underworld-not "us," the
mainstream of society. In short, drug enforcement procedures seem to
have no impact on daily life. But in fact the tentacles of drug enforcement have begun to reach into the lives of ordinary people, not just those
involved in the drug business. Civilian casualties in the War on Drugs
continue to mount as all levels of government increasingly resort to a
formidable array of "Big-Brother-is-watching" enforcement techniques.
A. Wiretapping
The War on Drugs has caused the United States to become an increasingly monitored country. Although telephone monitors are supposed to minimize interception of calls unrelated to the purpose of their
investigation by listening only long enough to determine content, wiretaps open all conversations on the line in question to scrutiny. In 1983,
court-authorized wiretaps rose 60%, primarily in cases of suspected drug
trafficking. The government sought and obtained 648 wiretaps. None of
23
its applications was denied.'
121. United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 (1lth Cir. 1987) (government's use of
contingently motivated informers not violative of due process).
122. United States v. Eugenio Llamera, No. 84-167-Cr (S.D. Fla. 1984).
123. Early, Wiretaps up 60 Percent, Reports Say, Miami Herald, June 16, 1984, at Al, A6.
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In a nation of 230,000,000, the number 648 seems small, and the
Department of Justice has no doubt exercised restraint in selecting wiretap targets. On the other hand, the number might well be much greater
if the DEA and FBI had the personnel necessary to staff the listening
posts and otherwise administer the taps.I24 The number would also likely
be larger if Congress lowered the substantial statutory barriers under Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act to obtaining an intercept
order from a court. 125 The pressures of the War on Drugs will sooner or
later crystallize the issue of reducing those impediments, since expanded
wiretap authority is probably the single most potent investigative tool for
drug conspiracy cases. With or without that "reform," the widening of
the War on Drugs will almost certainly produce more wiretaps next year
and the year after that. In any event, the precise number of wiretaps
should not be allowed to obscure the significance of the rapid growth of
this form of invasion of privacy. Wiretaps compromise a fundamental
principle, and the War on Drugs continues to erode it by encouragingor demanding-the proliferation of electronic surveillance.
124. It takes at least six persons to administer a single wiretap and listening post around
the clock: the supervising agent, 3 case (monitoring) agents, the technical agent, and the supervising attorney. UNITED STATES ATORNEYS MANUAL §§ 9-7.302, 9-7.311-.314.

125. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)). The request for authorization to apply for an intercept order
must travel up the chain of command from the field agent to the director or head of the
investigating agency, to a review by the office of enforcement operations, which in turn makes
a recommendation to the Assistant United States Attorney General. UNITED STATES AToR-

NEYS MANUAL § 9-7.140, at 10-11. The request must be in writing, accompanied by draft
copies of the application and order and a detailed affidavit containing specific information
establishing probable cause for the issuance of the intercept order. Id. § 9-7.150, at 11. The
request must also be approved personally by the United States Attorney in whose district the
application is to be filed. Id. § 9-7.110, at 9. Only the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General may authorize an application to a federal judge for an order
approving the interception of wire or oral communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982); see
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974). The procedure for, and contents of, an
application for an intercept order are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982).
Departmental policy requires that the applications be filed with a court by supervising
attorneys rather than by law enforcement officers. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL

§ 9-7.210, at 19. Standards for the issuance of the intercept order appear in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3) (1982). An order must confine the period of authorization to what is "necessary to
achieve the objective of the authorization," and cannot exceed 30 days. Id. § 2518(5). After
30 days, an extension may be sought by following the same procedures as for the initial order.
Agents are required to record the intercept "if possible." Id. § 2518(8)(a). Monitoring and
logging are required by departmental policy. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS MANUAL § 9-

7.313, at 24-25.
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Stopping Cars on Public Highways
TROOPERS AIMING AT DRUG FLOW ON TURNPIKE

For years, cars and trucks laden with marijuana, cocaine and pills have
been travelling north on Florida's Turnpike taking the cargo to northern buyers, lawmen say.
Last month, troopers routinely patrolling the turnpike from Palm
Beach to St. Lucie counties arrested 64 people on drug-related charges.
A month earlier, troopers had arrested only 14 persons.
The seizures and the arrests are the result of a heightened awareness among the troopers who are now making a serious effort to arrest
suspected smugglers.
"We want them to stop using the turnpike," said Sgt. Phil Moan
of Troop K, which is responsible for patrolling the entire length of the
turnpike....
Troopers, he said, became more suspicious of cars riding low in
the back. They also started looking closely at cars with out-of-state
tags if there were no luggage or clothing visible. Frequently, Moan
said, smugglers will use air fresheners and perfumes to mask the odor
of the narcotics.
"They look harder and harder at every vehicle," Moan said.
DEA's Lloyd said that state police agencies in other states are
also making an effort to stop the ground transportation of narcotics.
In New Mexico, he said, a state police program has been operating for several months. One of the indicators officials in New Mexico
watch for is Florida tags, he said.126
According to the article, the Florida Highway Patrol relied upon a drug
courier profile that cautioned troopers to be suspicious of rental cars,
"scrupulous obedience to traffic laws," and drivers wearing "lots of
gold," or who do not "fit vehicle," and "ethnic groups associated with
the drug trade." 127 The Florida Highway Patrol's reliance on the drug
courier profile was interrupted by a Palm Beach County court ruling that
articulated the civil liberties impact of the challenged practice. As recounted in a local newspaper:
Circuit Judge Carl Harper blasted the profile as "so broad and
indistinct as to ensnare the innocent as well as the guilty."
Harper ruled that the hypothetical description of drug smugglers
used by troopers to combat drug trafficking violates constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
"While we have a horrendous drug smuggling problem here in
South Florida, the ends simply do not justify the unlawful means occasionally employed to combat the problem," Harper said.
The judge said the profile gives troopers too much leeway in pull126. Pollack, Troopers Aiming at Drug Flow on Turnpike, Ft. Lauderdale News & SunSentinel, Aug. 6, 1984, § B, at 9.
127. FLORIDA DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF DRUG COURIERS § I.A.4 (1984).
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ing over cars to check out hunches that the vehicles may be carrying
drugs....
[Defense lawyer] Natale, hailing the ruling as a blow for the rights
of the public, said "Judge Harper was confronted with the question of,
do we let the Florida Highway Patrol decide who can proceed up and
down our highways free of unreasonable searches and seizures, or do
you decide to use the Constitution and follow the laws?"
Natale said patrol records showed a majority of the motorists arrested through the drug profile were black, suggesting the profile
merely gave troopers an excuse to pull drivers over and search their

vehicles. 128
Another tactic that police sometimes use is the roadblock. Police set
up a barrier, stop every vehicle at a given location, and check the driver's
license and registration. While one officer checks the paperwork, another
walks around the car with a trained drug-detector dog:
Under the watchful eyes of government attorneys, nearly 1,500 vehicles stopped last month by the Florida Highway Patrol for safety inspections were also checked for hidden contraband by drug-sniffing
police dogs.
One drug arrest was made. Lady Luck and Citizen Band radios
were suggested as possible causes for the lack of more arrests.
Still, authorities said they were sufficiently pleased with the operation, staged at four roadblocks in North Florida, to expand it to other
areas of the state as part of an intensified crackdown on drug
trafficking.
"I don't know how, where or when [they will resume], but we
want to send the message out that we will be aggressive in the War on
Drugs and will use every available tool," said Lee Gilreath, a special
agent who coordinated the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's
role in the multi-agency operation.129
The law does not regard the dog's sniffing as the equivalent of a
search on the theory that the odor of contraband is an exterior olfactory
clue in the public domain.1 30 As a result, no right of privacy is invaded
by the sniff, so the police do not need a search warrant or even probable
cause to use the dog on a citizen. If the dog "alerts," moreover, the signal
fulfills the cause requirement for further investigation of the driver or
vehicle for drugs.
C.

Monitoring of Students and School Personnel
The political climate supporting the War on Drugs has generated

128. Peck, Lawyers: Ruling Will Alter EH.P.Anti-Drug Effort, Ft. Lauderdale News &
Sun-Sentinel, June 28, 1985, § B, at 3.
129. Prendergast, Highway Drug Searches Raise Questions, Ft. Lauderdale News & SunSentinel, Feb. 26, 1984, § A, at 16.
130. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).

July 1987]

CRACKDOWN

increasingly invasive monitoring of personal behavior. In one manifestation of the antidrug pressure, drug-detector dogs have been brought into
public schools to sniff out student lockers, which are searched when the
dog alerts.13 1 The question arises whether students can claim the benefit
of the fourth amendment's protection from unreasonable search and
seizure. In a case involving the search of a high school student's purse,
the Supreme Court held that students do have privacy rights under the
fourth amendment, but that searches may occur on "reasonable grounds
132
for suspecting" that the student is violating the law or school rules.
Although the Court rejected the in loco parentisrationale, characterizing
the conduct of school officials as state action for constitutional purposes,
the Court's new "reasonable suspicion" test will undoubtedly permit far
133
more school searches than the probable cause standard.
The antidrug drive shows up in yet more intrusive ways. A school
system in Bergen County, New Jersey voted to implement a more comprehensive method of detecting drug violations by compelling students to
submit samples of their urine for testing in a drug laboratory. The
ACLU filed suit challenging the program, and the court enjoined it as
34
too broad.1
Once again, the outcomes in these situations matter less than the
persistence of the efforts and the attitudes they reveal. The pressures
underlying these plans, abortive or not, continue to mount and take other
forms. "Tipster" programs are another manifestation of the perceived
necessity to respond to the drug problem.
DRUGS, PAYOFFS AND THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL

[W]ell-meaning civic leaders have asked local citizens to turn in their
peers.... Town elders in Lewisville, Texas, (population 24,000) are
offering a $100 reward to students who provide information about
drug users or sellers at the local high school.
Though various American high schools have encouraged students
131. See Doe v. Renfro, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.

1980).
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
133. At least one commentator has concluded that the T.L.O. Court created "an unprecedented exception to the probable cause standard .... [Tihe reasonable grounds' standard
adopted by the Court will promote unjustified searches in public schools since the privacy
rights of students were not give adequate weight in the Court's balancing of relevant interests."
Alzenstein, FourthAmendment-Searches by Public Officials Valid on ReasonableGrounds,76
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 898, 908 (1985); see also Note, Public School Drug Searches:
Toward Redefining "Reasonableness" to Include Individualized Suspicion, 14 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 629, 633 (1986).
134. Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School Dist., No. C-4305-85E (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 9, 1985).
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to make anonymous tips on local drug pushers, only Lewisville's has
been desperate enough to post "wanted" signs and offer bounty.
Last September, Lewisville High School's principal, C. Douglas
Killough, solicited community leaders for commitments to pay for the
drug-reward program .....
Lewisville's business community responded enthusiastically to the
the proposed program. So many commitments were received, in fact,
that the local PTA ceased its solicitations. "It only took us a few days
•.." recalled John Zepka, an executive committee member of the Lewisville group.
To date, the program's practical success has turned out to be less
certain. An assistant principal at Lewisville High, Malcolm Dennis,
told the Dallas Morning News last week that "you'd be astonished at
how well the students are cooperating. Some have even turned in their
best friends."
But of the 30 students turned in to school authorities, principal
Killough himself told us, only half have actually been found in
possession. 135
D.

Keeping Tabs on the Populace by Computer
CONGRESSMEN, CELEBRITIES INCLUDED IN U.S. DRUG FILES

The federal Drug Enforcement Administration is keeping computer files on more than 1.5 million persons, including U.S. congressmen, entertainers, clergymen, industry leaders and foreign dignitaries,
according to DEA Administrator Francis M. Mullen Jr.
Many of the famous persons named in the computerized index
system, known as NADDIS (Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System), are the subject of "unsubstantiated allegations of illegal
activity," Mullen said....
Mullen's letter stated that "less than 5 percent [or 7,500 of the
total 1.5 million persons whose names were added to the computer
since 1974]... are under investigation as suspected narcotic traffickers
by DEA."
The NADDIS computer system contains data from informants,
suspects, surveillance and intelligence
reports compiled by DEA and
136
other agencies, Mullen said.
The information on NADDIS is available to federal drug enforcement
officials in other agencies, such as the FBI, Customs, and the IRS. State
law enforcement officials can probably also gain access on request. Obviously, this method of oversight has troubling implications for one's personal interest in privacy and good reputation, especially for the ninetyfive percent named who are not under active investigation. A data bank
135. Sherer, Drugs, Payoffs, and the American High School, Ft. Lauderdale News & SunSentinel, March 26, 1983, § A, at 23.
136. Christensen, Congressmen, Celebrities Included in U.S. Drug Files, Ft. Lauderdale
News & Sun-Sentinel, July 3, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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of this kind becomes objectionable for other reasons: the quality of the
data is dubious, controls on access and disclosure appear inadequate, and
the consequences of being included could be severe. Does one become a
target of investigation as a result of such a listing? And what about the
sheer number of listings? At a certain point the numbers grow too large
for comfort.
E. Stigmatizing
Another anecdote from the press illustrates yet a further result of
the antidrug crusade:
"Public embarrassment" is the federal government's goal in publishing a list of names of people caught bringing small amounts of
drugs into the United States-beginning tomorrow-says Dennis Murphy, a U.S. Customs spokesman in Washington.
But critics of the plan, including Charles Sims, staff counsel for

the American Civil Liberties Union in New York, say the list amounts
to "slander" of people who have not been found guilty of any crime.
The punish-by-publishing list, to be supplied to news organizations each Wednesday, will include only small-scale smugglers who
were neither arrested nor prosecuted for their alleged crimes, said
Harry Carnes, Miami Customs District Director.
The "drug blotter" will include the name of each alleged smuggler, address, occupation, age, type and quantity of drugs being smuggled, method of travel and point of origin, Customs said in a prepared
statement.

Carnes said persons whose cases are dropped from prosecution
will automatically be put on the press list-with no option to request
arrest as an alternative.
"One principal reason for trials in this country is to decide who is
innocent and who is guilty," Sims said.
"When the police undertake to announce that people are guilty
without a trial, then they are slandering people ....

They will be

damaging people's reputations."
Miami attorney Richard Sharpstein labeled the plan "disgusting."
According to Sharpstein, people who are arrested on drug charges
would have more legal rights than
those who aren't arrested, but find
1 37
themselves on the customs list.

F. Militarizing Law Enforcement
Millions of recreational boaters and small craft fliers are now exposed to the possibility of an encounter with the Armed Forces of the
United States. By amending the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981 and authorizing the Navy to interdict smuggling vessels at sea, Congress in137. Payne, U.S. List ofSmall DrugDeals Criticized, Miami Herald, Mar. 26, 1985, at DI,
cal. 2.
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flicted the first major breach in the century-old wall of separation
between civilian and military law enforcement roles. 138 Of course, even
that sacrifice of principle to expedience proved insufficient to fulfill the
illusory quest to bring the illegal drug supply under "control." Accordingly, several members of Congress soon began seeking a wider military
role. Some sought full and direct military participation in drug enforcement, while others sought merely to expand the military's back-up role.
In 1985, Congress reached a "compromise" position.
Congressional negotiators have agreed on a plan that allows the
military to stop more drug traffickers headed for South Florida but
does not give them the power to make civilian arrests.
Rep. Charles Bennett of Florida had pressed for a stronger plan
that would have given the military the authority to search, seize and
arrest drug traffickers at sea.
The Jacksonville Democrat settled for a compromise after his
plan became a sticking point in negotiations.
"The compromise isn't bad at all," Bennett said. "It strengthens
our hand against drug smugglers, and that's what we were after." ...
The conferees agreed to spend $15 million for 500 new Coast
Guard officers who will be stationed on naval ships in the prime drug
trafficking routes in the Caribbean and off the Gulf Coast.
The Navy ships will be able to stop vessels suspected of carrying
drugs and the Coast Guard officers will be able to board and search the
vessels and make arrests.
The compromise allows the Navy to become more involved in
drug interdiction while avoiding the legal ramifications of having the
military make civilian arrests.
Opponents of more naval involvement fear that military arrests
139
would infringe civil liberties and end up in lengthy court cases.
But what will happen next? Surely, this latest enlargement of military "assistance" will not "win" the War on Drugs; and therefore it cannot placate the demands for still more intervention. On the contrary, the
1985 compromise represents only a transitional phase. Its real signifi138. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982), prohibits civil law enforcement
by the military; however, amendments to Title X of the United States Code now allow the
military to gather information, advise, lend equipment, and deploy personnel at the request of
local law enforcement officials with jurisdiction over drug or immigration offenses. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1114 (1981) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-385 (1982)). The Navy was partially exempted from the restrictions of the
Posse Comitatus Act by regulations implementing the 1981 amendments, and Naval vessels
typically assist in drug interdiction operations by transporting Coast Guard officers to a target
vessel and towing seized ships back to port. See United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d
113, 116 (1st Cir. 1984); 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(c) (1982); see also Note, supra note 15, at 421
(citing Thompson, The Federal War on Drugs: The U.S. Military Joins the Battle, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 13, 1984, at 1).
139. Bowers, Lawmakers Bolster Naval War on Drugs, Miami Herald, June 27, 1985, at
Al, col. 3.
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cance lies in the momentum generated for further enlargements of the
military's enforcement role. And the dynamics of the War on Drugs will
carry that escalation even further. The House of Representatives, for
example, resolved that the President should deploy the Armed Forces of
the United States "to substantially halt the influx of drugs" into the
United States within forty-five days. 14° Political accommodation with
the Senate took the silly edge off that vote, but the pressure to "unleash
the military" in the War on Drugs will not easily go away. 141

IV.

Conclusion

The historic dynamic of the American drug control movement has
been expansionary. Pretrial detention, longer and mandatory prison
sentences, enhanced fines and property forfeitures, good faith exceptions
to the exclusionary rule, roadblocks, drug-detector dogs, wiretaps, informants, undercover agents, extradition treaties, tax investigations, computers, currency controls-the list grows and grows. And still it is not
enough. Always the government needs more.
The latest "imperative" in the War on Drugs is compulsory and
sometimes random urine sampling for traces of illegal drugs, a practice
now followed by one-fourth of Fortune 500 companies, 14 2 by many local
governments, and by the United States of America for its employees and

the employees of federal contractors.143 The practice of watching an employee or applicant pee into a jar would seem to implicate rights of pri140. H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H6459 (1986).
141. The Defense Drug Interdiction Assistance Act of 1986 continues this trend by authorizing a substantial increase in funding for interdiction efforts and greater use of military
resources. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3052, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(No. 10A).
142. General Dynamics, General Motors, Greyhound, E.F. Hutton, IBM, Mobil, The
New York Times, The Teamsters, and United Auto Workers are but a few of the enterprises
that have recently instituted some type of workplace drug testing. Ross, Drug Testing at Work
Spreading-andLikely to Spread Further,L.A. Daily J., June 6, 1985, at 4, col. 3; see also
Kaufman, The Battle over Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. See
generally Testingfor Drugs in the American Workplace, 11 NOVA L. REv. 291 (1987); Wisotsky, The Ideology of Drug Testing, 11 Nova L.J. 763 (1987). One rationale for requiring that
urinalysis be predicated upon individual suspicion is the not-unlikely possibility of a false positive result:
Two Navy doctors were almost drummed out of the service [in 1984] because they
tested positive for morphine, the result of having eaten too many poppy seed bagels.
Indeed, the Navy program has seen huge errors-over 4,000 men and women were
recalled at full back pay [in 1985] because they were discharged on the basis of a
[false positive].
Ross, supra, at 4, col. 3.
143. See President's Message Announcing the Goals and Objectives of the National Campaign Against Drug Abuse, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1040, 1041 (Aug. 4, 1986).
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vacy recognized by the fourth amendment, and most federal courts have
ruled that some showing of individualized suspicion is required to compel a public employee to submit to urinalysis. 144 But exceptions have
been carved out for some classes of employees, 145 and the view that the
right of privacy does not protect bodily wastes has gained some support. 146 Whatever the final resolution of the issue, the private sector will
remain largely free to require such tests. Drug testing, of course, is only
part of a much larger picture. The real question is this: what happens
when drug testing is absorbed into the culture without noticeable effect
on the black market in drugs? What will the next round of escalation
bring?
That question, ultimately, shows the truly insidious quality of the
War on Drugs: the drug enforcement system can never have enough
power or resources, to win the war. In the futile quest to control the
uncontrollable, the government follows an imperative to expand. Legislative reforms, doubling of "troops," administrative directives, task
forces, executive coordination-all of these have proven ineffective in
controlling the drug supply. Yet the reflexive response of the system is
always to do more, always to expand. "In one sense," said former Attorney General William French Smith, "to deal with this problem, we have
147
to blanket the world."
Blanketing the world, of course, begins at home. When one initiative after another fails to produce any discernible or lasting impact on the
black market in drugs, the frustrated impetus for control carries the system to its next "logical" extension. The internal logic of the War on
Drugs, coupled with its insatiable appetite for resources and power in its
futile pursuit, leads inevitably to repressive measures. The authoritarian
logic of drug control was noted, although not endorsed, by the President's Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse more than a decade
ago:
Under certain conditions, perhaps, law enforcement alone might
eliminate the illicit market in drugs. To achieve this, though, would
require, at the least, multifold increases in man-power, a suspension of
144. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Everett v. Napper, 632 F. Supp.
1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
145. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (systematic random
selection upheld for prison guards); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (administrative search exception to fourth amendment applied to jockeys).
146. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir.
1987) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
147. Brinkley, The War on Narcotics: Can It Be Won?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1984, § A at
1, col. 4.
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Fourth Amendment restraints on police searches, seizures and wiretaps, wide-scale pretrial detention, abolition of the exclusionary rule
and border controls148so extreme that they would substantially hinder
foreign commerce.
In a nutshell, the Commission suggested, a successful drug enforcement
program requires a police state.
In the United States, warnings about a police state sound a bit excessive, if not jejune, if one has in mind the nations of the Soviet Bloc. Our
contemporary reality is quite different. The gradual accretion of enforcement powers moves so slowly as to be invisible to the untrained eye. The
rights of citizens recede by gradual erosion, by relentless nibbling, rather
than gobbling. Yet the danger to civil liberties is no less real, especially
in the realm of criminal justice. Magistrate Peter Nimkoff of the Southern District of Florida dramatized that reality in his resignation from the
federal court in protest of the continued erosion of the rights of those
accused of crime. In an exit interview with the press, Nimkoff focused
on the War on Drugs as the source of governmental abuses of power:
According to Nimkoff, many people have decided "that because drugs
are such a horrible thing, we will bend the Constitution in drug cases,"
or "that there are two constitutions--one for criminal cases generally,
and another for drug cases. ... I think that's wrong. ... It invites
police officers to behave like criminals. And they do."
Among his specific areas of concern are:
* Government sting operations in which it is considered "sound
police practice to get people to do bad things in order that they can
then be accused," Nimkoff said.
* Use of informants who pretend to be criminals during ongoing
investigations and then testify about what they did. Nimkoff said that
the use of civilian informants and assignment of police as undercover
agents are "very, very dangerous" practices.
"Justice Brandeis said about 60 years ago that government is the
omnipresent teacher, especially in a democracy," he said. "And that
the police practices of our government teach moral lessons to our society. And I think it is wrong and dangerous for the police to make a
norm of deception. .. "
"It's a very dangerous practice for the police to begin to behave
like criminals in order to catch criminals, and to encourage the commission of the offense instead of preventing its occurrence."
Nimkoff said he's also troubled by the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, which he said undercuts the presumption of innocence and removed the traditional presumption that a defendant is entitled to bond before trial.
Although most criminal defendants are eventually found guilty,
Nimkoff said, "I'm very reluctant to discard the presumption of
148. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE,
AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 229 (Main Report) (1972).
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human freedom or the presumption of innocence.... To discard them
is to engage in classically authoritarian behaviors." 149
Magistrate Nimkoff's resignation, however unusual, reflects a traditional concern. Even Justice Hugo Black, an advocate of aggressive enforcement against the drug trade, warned of its ready capacity for excess:
"The narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to our basic liberties by
making attractive the adoption of constitutionally forbidden shortcuts
that might suppress and blot out more quickly the unpopular and dangerous conduct." 150 As the War on Drugs converts paramilitary rhetoric into social reality, the nation's threshold for extremist ideas rises.
Thus, the politics of the War on Drugs generates proposals that only a
few years ago would have been repudiated as either absurd or excessive.
In this climate of repression, politicians advocate capital punishment for drug dealers, or isolating them in Arctic Gulags, or simply
shooting drug planes out of the sky without charges or trial.1 51 What
will tomorrow's political agenda find tolerable? A bill in the Florida Senate proposed to prohibit the sale of "any magazine or other printed matter the dominant theme and purpose of which, taken as a whole, is to
advocate, advise, encourage, or glorify the unlawful consumption,
purchase, or usage of any controlled substance.. .". ,:2 Despite the bill's
analogy to valid antiobscenity statutes, it almost certainly violates the
right of free speech under existing case law--even advocacy of the violent
overthrow of the government finds protection under the first amendment,
absent a "clear and present danger" of intended imminent violence.15 3
But case law and history also demonstrate that war-time emergencies can
justify curtailment of constitutional rights, and the analogy to the War
on Drugs beckons. "When a nation is at war many things that might be
said in time of peace ... will not be endured .... ,,154 Or when "our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger."' 155
After a few more years of frustration with the War on Drugs, extremist proposals may not seem so far-fetched. Repeated expansions of
governmental powers have already gained acceptance as reasonable or
149. Payne, Upset with Court Trends, Top-Rated Nimkoff to Quit, Miami News, Jan. 4,
1986, § A, at 1.
150. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1979) (Black, J., dissenting).
151. Daray, Jericho: An American Gulag, NEWSDAY, Winter 1982-83; Sachs, Clark- Use
Armed Might in Drug War, Miami Herald, Nov. 21, 1981, at B1, col. 2.
152. H.B. 410, Fla. House of Representatives, Introduced by Rep. Liberti (1984).
153. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
154. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
155. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944).
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"necessary" measures to fight the War on Drugs. Given the nature of
the beast, we can expect the demands for more power to spiral upward
towards infinity. There is no light at the end of the law enforcement
tunnel.
Already, some of the authoritarian methods mentioned by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, such as pretrial detention, have become law. Why not go further and abolish the
exclusionary rule altogether, authorizing drug agents to search for
drugs, tap telephones, or seize financial records without warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion? Why not adopt a bounty hunter system for suspected drug dealers and teach school children to report their
parents for drug possession? Why not, in fact, bypass entirely the cumbersome criminal justice system, with its tedious set of impediments to
investigation, prosecution, and conviction, and substitute a control system consisting of civil sanctions: fines, asset seizures and forfeitures.
Control over the offender's future conduct would come, as one law professor has already proposed,1 56 through a civil injunction forbidding the
defendant from violating the drug laws in the future. Violation of the
injunction would be proved in a civil contempt proceeding by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, rather than by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as required in a criminal prosecution: no need for grand jury indictment, right to counsel, or even for trial by jury. After all, if the
United States Code is the "enemy,"' 157 it must be overcome.
Personal freedom is the inevitable casualty of the War on Drugs.
The zealous pursuit of drug offenders is manifested in the adoption of
increasingly stringent punishments for existing drug offenses, the
proliferation of new drug-related criminal legislation by Congress, more
aggressive investigative and prosecutorial initiatives, generally supported
by judicial validations. Taken together, these developments suggest that
the legal system is evolving to take the paramilitary rhetoric of the War
on Drugs at face value. Like the wartime curtailment of civil liberties
during both World Wars, 158 the War on Drugs is used to justify the application of force majeure. In short, the War on Drugs is producing a
political-legal context in which drug enforcement constitutes an exception to the principle that laws must comport "with the deepest notions of
156. Flittie, Proposed Emergency Civil Drug Control Act, in 3 DRUG USE IN AMERICA:
PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 481 (1973).

157. See supra note 34.
158. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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what is fair and just."159 In drug enforcement, most anything goes. This
dishonors our legacy of limited government and natural rights, those
"principles of justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 160 It also sets a very dangerous
precedent, for it is doubtful that drugs can be treated as sui generis in the
long run. Inevitably, the drug exception will spill over to other areas of
the law. We clearly face the danger of losing the ability, in Madison's
161
immortal phrase, to "oblige [the government] to control itself."

159.
160.
161.
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